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| 个人信息 |
| 姓 名： |
罗译员 [编号]:683 |
性 别： |
女 |
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| 擅长专业： |
翻译方向 |
出生年月： |
1987/9/1 |
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| 民 族： |
汉族 |
所在地区： |
广东 深圳 |
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| 文化程度： |
本科 |
所学专业： |
英语翻译 |
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| 毕业时间： |
39995 |
毕业学校： |
西安外国语大学 |
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| 第一外语： |
英语 |
等级水平： |
专业八级 |
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| 口译等级： |
一般 |
工作经历： |
1 年 |
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| 翻译库信息 |
| 可翻译语种： |
英语 |
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| 目前所在地： |
广东 深圳 |
| 可提供服务类型： |
笔译、口译、家教 |
| 每周可提供服务时间： |
周六周日以及每周一到周五晚上 |
| 证书信息 |
| 证书名称： |
国家人事部三级口译证书 |
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| 获证时间： |
2009/1/1 |
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| 获得分数： |
68 |
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| 证书名称： |
英语专业八级证书 |
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| 获证时间： |
2009/5/1 |
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| 获得分数： |
71 |
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| 工作经历 |
| 工作时期： |
2009/3/1--2009/5/1 |
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| 公司名称： |
瑞士Housetrip公司 |
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| 公司性质： |
外商独资 |
| 所属行业： |
餐饮/旅游 |
| 所在部门： |
客服部门 |
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| 职位： |
信息搜索员 |
| 自我评价： |
61548 国家人事部三级口译证书。国家人事部在全国实行的统一的、面向社会的、国内最具权威的翻译专业资格（水平）认证。各省每年的通过人数仅为4-6人。
61548 拥有良好扎实的听说读写基础，优秀的口译及笔译实践能力，具备一定的商务英语基础，掌握了外贸、营销类的相关知识。能够从事商务和外事方面的陪同口译工作、会议口译工作以及各类文本笔译工作。
为人稳重大方，活泼幽默，有在压力下工作的素质，乐于吃苦，适应能力强，富于团队合作精神，具有较强语言与文字表达能力、人际沟通协调能力。思维缜密，具有较好的分析和解决问题的能力。 |
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| 工作时期： |
2009/5/1--2009/12/1 |
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| 公司名称： |
广东深圳基粒科技有限公司 |
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| 公司性质： |
民营企业 |
| 所属行业： |
公关/商务 |
| 所在部门： |
市场部 |
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| 职位： |
翻译助理 |
| 自我评价： |
从事商务信息翻译 |
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| 笔译案例信息 |
| 案例标题： |
《2007年度就中国履行WTO义务的情况向国会提交的报告》 |
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| 原文： |
China's WTO accession agreement reinforces China's obligation to only maintain export restrictions allowed under WTO rules. In this regard, Article XI of the GATT 1994 generally prohibits WTO members from maintaining export restrictions (other than duties, taxes or other charges), although certain limited exceptions are allowed. China also agreed to eliminate all taxes and charges on exports, including export duties, except as included in Annex 6 to the Protocol of Accession or applied in conformity with Article VIII of GATT 1994. Article VIII of GATT 1994 only permits fees and charges limited to the approximate cost of services rendered and makes clear that any such fees and charges shall not represent an indirect protection to domestic products or a taxation of exports for fiscal purposes.
Despite these commitments, since its accession to the WTO, China has continued to impose restrictions on exports of raw materials, including quotas, related licensing requirements and duties, as China's state planners have continued to guide the development of downstream industries. These export restrictions are widespread. For example, China maintains export quotas and sometimes exports duties on antimony, coke, fluorspar, indium, magnesium carbonate, molybdenum, rare earths, silicon, talc, tin, tungsten and zinc all of which are of key interest to U.S. downstream producers.
Normally, these types of export restrictions significantly distort trade, and for that reason the WTO rules outlaw them. In the case of China, the trade-distortive impact is exacerbated because China is the world's leading producer of each of the raw materials at issue (except for molybdenum, for which China is the world's second leading producer).
China's export restrictions affect U.S. and other foreign producers of a wide range of downstream products, such as steel, chemicals, ceramics, semiconductor chips, refrigerants, medical imagery, aircraft, refined petroleum products, fiber optic cables and catalytic converters, among numerous others. The export restrictions create disadvantages for these foreign producers by artificially increasing China's export prices for their raw material inputs, which also drives up world prices. At the same time, the export restrictions artificially lower China's domestic prices for the raw materials due to significant domestic oversupply, enabling China's domestic downstream producers to produce lower-priced products from the raw materials and thereby creating significant advantages for China's domestic downstream producers when competing against foreign downstream producers both in the China market and in export markets.
In an attempt to justify some of China's export restrictions, MOFCOM has cited Article XX(g) of GATT 1994, which permits a WTO member to impose measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, provided that such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption, and provided they are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade. However, serious questions arise concerning whether China meets this standard because it does not appear to impose restrictions on the domestic side that are in any way comparable to its export restrictions. China's treatment of coking coal, a key steel input, provides a relevant example. China imposes a resource tax on all coal used in producing coking coal, or coke, in China, whether destined for domestic sale or export. Nevertheless, while the resource tax applies equally to domestic sales and exports, China also places other restrictions on coke, but they only apply to exports. China limits exports of coke to 14 million metric tons (MT) per year and additionally imposes 15 percent duties on coke exports. With these export restrictions in place and no comparable restrictions on the domestic side, China produced 298 million MT of coking coal in 2006, and all but 14 million MT of this production was sold in the domestic market.
Beginning shortly after China's WTO accession, the United States repeatedly raised its concerns about China's continued use of export restrictions, particularly on coke and fluorspar, both bilaterally and at the WTO during the annual transitional reviews before the Committee on Market Access and the Council for Trade in Goods. The United States also worked with other WTO members with an interest in this issue, including the EC and Japan. In response to these efforts, as previously reported, China refused to modify its policies in this area. In fact, over time, China's state planners have increased the artificial advantages afforded to China's downstream producers by making the export quotas more restrictive and by imposing or increasing export duties on many raw materials at issue.
During the run-up to the JCCT meeting scheduled for December 2007, the United States has been pressing China to eliminate the export quotas and export duties on the 12 raw materials of key interest to U.S. industry, which includes antimony, coke, fluorspar, indium, magnesium carbonate, molybdenum, rare earths, silicon, talc, tin, tungsten and zinc. The United States will continue to pursue this matter in 2008, if necessary, to ensure that China fully meets its WTO commitments and will take further actions seeking the elimination of China’s export restrictions, including through WTO dispute settlement, where appropriate.
China's state planners also attempt to manage the export of many intermediate and downstream products, often by raising or lowering the value-added tax (VAT) rebate available upon export and sometimes by imposing or retracting export duties. These practices have caused tremendous disruption, uncertainty and unfairness in the markets for particular products.
Sometimes, as in the case of China's export quotas, the objective of these adjustments is to make larger quantities of a product available domestically at lower prices than the rest of the world. For example, China decided in 2006 to eliminate the 13 percent VAT rebate available on the export of refined metal lead and then, in 2007, imposed a duty of 10 percent on refined metal lead exports. These actions caused a steep decline in China's exports of this intermediate product and have contributed to a sharp rise in world prices, which have gone from approximately $1,300 per metric ton (MT) at the time of China's elimination of the export VAT rebate in 2006 to approximately $3,200 per MT in recent months. Meanwhile, Chinese domestic prices have reportedly declined because of China's captive refined metal lead production, giving China's downstream producers a substantial competitive advantage over foreign downstream producers.
In other recent situations, China has reduced or eliminated VAT export rebates in an attempt to reign in out-of-control expansion of production capacity in particular sectors. China resorts to this practice in part because it has not yet developed a fully functioning market economy and therefore cannot simply leave it to the market to bring about the necessary adjustments. In some instances, the adjustments have benefited U.S. producers by slowing surges in low-priced exports from China to the United States. However, the adjustments can also have harmful consequences, whether or not intended. For example, in November 2006 and April 2007, China reduced export VAT rebates that had been available on a wide range of semi-finished and finished steel products, as part of its efforts to discourage further unneeded creation of production capacity for these products in China. At the same time, these export VAT rebate reductions did not target all steel products, and the result was that Chinese steel producers shifted their production to steel products for which full export VAT rebates were still available, particularly steel pipe and tube products, causing a tremendous surge in exports of these products - many of which found their way into the U.S. market.
The United States and other WTO members questioned China's export VAT rebate practices during China's first Trade Policy Review at the WTO, held in April 2006, and have urged China to undertake the economic reforms necessary for it to complete its transition to a market economy. The United States has also raised these concerns during bilateral meetings, such as the Steel Dialogue meetings in October 2006 and August 2007 and the April 2007 meeting of the Structural Issues Working Group, an entity that was created at the April 2004 JCCT meeting. In addition, in the case of export duties not authorized by Annex 6 to its Protocol of Accession, the United States has urged China to eliminate them, given China's specific commitment not to use them.
To date, China has been willing to take steps to remedy some of the unintended consequences of its export VAT rebate reductions when the United States has brought it to China's attention. In July 2007, for example, China issued a notice extending export VAT rebate reductions to most steel pipe and tube products, with the notable exception of oil country tubular goods.
In 2008, the United States will continue to engage China in this area. The United States' basic message will continue to be that China needs to pursue the additional economic reforms that will allow China to rely on the market, rather than government intervention, to bring about needed production capacity adjustments in particular sectors of the economy.
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| 译文： |
《中国加入WTO议定书》强化了中国的义务，中国只能保留WTO允许的出口限制措施。在这方面，《1994年关税与贸易总协定》第11条明令禁止WTO成员设定出口限制（关税、税收或其他收费除外），同时也允许个别例外。中国还同意取消对出口征收的所有税费，包括出口关税。《中国加入议定书》附件6中包括的收费或与《1994年关税与贸易总协定》第七条一致的收费除外。《1994年关税与贸易总协定》第八条允许成员国收取所提供的服务的约计成本费，并且明确规定，任何此类收费不应向国内产品提供间接保护，不应作为出口税收以达到本国政府的财政目的。
尽管中国做出了上述种种承诺，但是自其入世以来，中国仍旧在向原材料出口施加限制，包括配额、许可要求和关税，同时，国家机构依旧操控着下游企业的发展。这些出口限制遍及各个领域。例如，中国保留了出口配额，有时还对锑、焦炭、氟石、铟、碳酸镁、钼、稀土、硅、云母、锡、钨、锌等原材料的出口征收出口关税，而这些原材料都牵系着美国下游生产商的切身利益。
通常这些类型的出口限制会极大地扭曲贸易发展，基于此种原因，WTO规则宣布这些出口限制为非法措施。由于中国是世界上上述所提及的所有原材料的首要生产商（钼不在其列，中国是世界第二大钼生产商），贸易故此受到的干扰影响更为巨大。
中国的出口限制措施影响了美国和其他国家的各类下游产品生产商，比如钢铁、化学制品、陶瓷、半导体片、制冷剂、医学成像、飞机、精制石油产品、光缆和催化式排气净化器等，不一而足。出口限制措施人为地提高了中国原材料的出口价格，将国外生产商置于不利境地，同时也抬高了全球原材料的价格。与此同时，由于中国国内供给过剩，出口限制措施人为地降低国内的原材料价格，使得国内的下游生产商可以利用这些原材料生产出相对而言价格更低的产品，从而为其在中国市场和出口市场上同国外下游生产商竞争时创造巨大优势。
中国商务部引用《1994年关税与贸易总协定》第20条，企图为中国的一些出口限制措施加以辩解。该条款允许WTO成员采取保护可耗尽自然资源的措施，前提是这些措施需结合对国内生产或消费的限制措施以达到预期效果，并且其实施方式不会致使它们成为专断或不合理地区别对待情况相似的国家的手段，或是成为一种伪装起来的限制国际贸易的手段。然而，各方不断就中国能否达到这一标准提出质疑，因为中国看似并没有在国内方面施行与出口限制等同的限制。中国在炼焦煤这一关键钢铁输入领域的处理方法即是一个例证。中国对国内用于生产炼焦煤或者焦煤的所有煤炭征收资源税，不论这些炼焦煤和焦煤是内销还是出口。然而，在对内销和出口平等征收资源税的同时，中国还对焦煤施以其它限制，但是这一限制措施仅针对用于出口的焦煤。中国将焦煤年出口量限额为1400万公吨，并另外对焦煤出口征收15%的关税。在设定这些出口限制而在国内方面不加以同等限制的情况下，2006年，中国总计生产了2.98亿公吨炼焦煤，而其中仅有1400万公吨是内销。
在2007年11月中美商贸联委会的预备阶段，美国已敦促中国取消对关乎美国产业利益的十二种原材料所设定的出口配额以及所征收的出口关税，其中包括锑、焦炭、氟石、铟、碳酸镁、钼、稀土、硅、云母、锡、钨、锌。如果有必要，美国将在2008年继续努力确保中国充分兑现其入世承诺，进一步采取措施，包括启动WTO争端解决机制, 敦促中国完全取消出口限制。
中国国家机关还妄图凭借提高或降低从出口中获取的增值税退税(VAT)，施加或撤销出口关税，操控一些中间产品和下游产品的出口。这些做法已经在个别产品市场造成了巨大的破坏，无数不确定因素和不公平现象由此应运而生。
有时，同中国设定出口配额的目的一样，做出这些调整旨在使中国国内能够以较世界其他各地更为低廉的价格获得某一大宗产品。譬如，2006年，中国决定取消13%的从精炼金属铅出口中获得的增值税退税，2007年，中国又对精炼金属铅出口征收10%的关税。这些举动致使这一中间产品的出口急剧下滑，进而使得精炼金属铅的全球价格从2006年中国取消出口增值税退税时的每公吨1300美元攀升到近几个月来的每公吨3200美元。与此同时，据报道，中国国内价格因为精炼金属铅生产遭到控管而有所下滑，使得下游生产商在与外国的下游生产商竞争时占据了绝对的优势地位。
近期，中国已经降低或取消了出口增值税退税，企图遏制一些行业失控的产能扩张。中国诉诸于这种做法的部分原因是，中国还尚未建成一个正常运作的市场经济，故而无法只是简单地将这一问题交付给市场来做出必要的调整。有些情况下，美国生产商从这些调整中获得了丰厚的利益，这些调整措施减缓了中国低廉商品涌入美国的步伐。然而，这些调整，无论是有意还是无意，也造来了一些不良后果。例如，中国先后于2006年11月和2007年4月降低了一系列半成品钢品和成品钢品的出口增值税退税，其用心在于遏制这些产品的生产力的进一步提高。与此同时，这些减少出口增值税退税的举措并不是针对所有的钢铁产品，结果致使中国的钢铁生产商转向生产那些仍然可以获得全额出口增值税退税的钢铁产品，特别是钢管，最终这些产品的对外出口量猛增，其中很大一部分打入了美国市场。
美国和其他WTO成员在2006年4月WTO首次对中国贸易政策审议会议上便对中国的出口增值税退税政策提出了质疑，敦促中国进行必要的经济改革，以便过渡至市场经济。在双边会议上，比如在2006年10月举行的钢铁对话会议上，以及在由中美商贸联委会于2004年4月创立的结构性问题工作组2007年4月的会议上，美国多次表示，美国对此甚为忧虑。另外，针对中国征收未经加入议定书附件6批准的出口税，并鉴于中国已具体承诺不会这么做，美国敦促中国取消这些出口税。
自从美国指出中国的出口增值税退税削减政策会无意中产生严重后果后，中国有关方面开始重视这一问题，至今仍一直积极地采取措施进行补救。例如，2007年7月，中国发布公告宣称出口增值税退税削减政策涉及范围包括绝大多数的钢管产品，值得注意的是，石油管材除外。
2008年，美国将继续敦促中国改正这个问题，并保持自己的立场，即中国另外还需推行一些经济改革，从而使中国可以依靠市场而非政府干预来在一些行业中做出必要的产能调整。
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